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ESSAY
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENTS AND
RELIGIOUS IDENTITY
Bernadette Meyler*
At a time when we are inundated daily with accounts of fundamen-
talism in various guises, and when those purporting to speak for religion
often engage in attacks on secular government, Steve Shiffrin's book,
The Religious Left and Church-State Relations,I has supplied an invalua-
ble corrective to the prevailing views about the relationships that can be
constructed between religion and the public sphere. Both constitute, for
Shiffrin, realms of vigorous debate-debates that may sometimes over-
lap, but not in the ways to which we are accustomed. While concerned
with generating citizens skilled in and desirous of participating in the
public sphere, the book simultaneously eschews the idea that such partic-
ipation must assume a resolutely secular form. Instead, Shiffrin revital-
izes the notion of a religious Left that might engage in the civic arena
without checking religion at the door. Under Shiffrin's account, this "re-
ligious Left," or the class of "religious liberals," could furnish justifica-
tions for certain positions on church-state relations that would appear
more plausible coming from their vantage point and would not be feasi-
ble for secular liberals to offer. 2 It is with this latter suggestion that I
part ways with The Religious Left. In my view, the articulation of the
church-state views in question does not require religious liberals; addi-
tionally, I am not convinced that recourse to a religious liberal position
can serve as broad a discursive function as Shiffrin seems to suggest.
Before explaining why I disagree with Shiffrin about these issues, I
would like to focus on three particular ways in which Shiffrin has cleared
the ground for further exploration of the relationship between religious
individuals and the public sphere. First, he has managed to disassociate
religious believers from a particular orientation toward the Free Exercise
* Professor of Law and English, Cornell University; Mellon/LAPA Fellow in Law and
Humanities and Visiting Associate Professor of Comparative Literature, Princeton University.
These comments were initially presented at the book celebrations in honor of Steve Shiffrin
held at Cornell Law School in November of 2009. Discussions with co-panelists Sally Gordon
and Kent Greenawalt, as well as with Steve himself, helped shape the final version of these
remarks. Matthew Smith also provided an invaluable sounding board.
1 STEVEN H. Srittiw', THE RELIGIOuS LEsr AND CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS (2009).
2 See id. at 100-36.
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and Establishment Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. 3 As he explains,
"My particular interest here is to focus on those citizens who favor free
exercise and oppose tight connections between church and state in accor-
dance with their religious premises."' 4 Religious conservatives who can
claim membership within one of the currently more dominant religious
traditions, such as Justice Antonin Scalia, often appear to support closer
relations between church and state and to advocate a less separationist
construction of the Establishment Clause. 5 At the same time, someone
like Scalia, who authored the majority opinion in Employment Division v.
Smith6 against which liberals and conservatives alike protested, does not
favor broad grants of exemptions for free exercise purposes from neutral,
generally applicable laws. 7 Hence, Scalia would occupy the position op-
posite to the one that Shiffrin describes. There are, presumably, also
those who might be called religious conservatives who favor free exer-
cise; in other words, some identified as religious conservatives would
probably favor free exercise even if they did not oppose tight connec-
tions between church and state. 8 On the secular side, Shiffrin takes Chris
3 See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .....
4 SHIFFRIN, supra note 1, at 1.
5 Like a number of his colleagues on the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia identifies as a
Catholic. See Charles M. Blow, The Catholic Court, By the Numbers Blog, http://
blow.blogs.nytimes.com (May 26, 2009, 15:43 EST) (tracking the shift from a primarily Prot-
estant to a majority Catholic Supreme Court) (Justice Scalia's Catholic colleagues include
Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Alito, Thomas, Kennedy, and now, Justice Sotomayor, who
replaced Justice Souter, a Protestant, shortly after Charles Blow's post was written). Justice
Scalia's dissenting opinion in McCreary County, Kentucky v. American Civil Liberties Union
of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005), articulates his view that expressions of monotheism-and,
in particular, honoring the Ten Commandments in a non-denominational manner-"cannot be
reasonably understood as a government endorsement of a particular religious viewpoint." Id.
at 494 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a commentary on, and critique of, Justice Scalia's dissent in
McCreary County and its implications for interpreting the Establishment Clause, see Thomas
Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice Scalia, the Ten Commandments, and
the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1097 (2006).
6 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
7 Smith held that neutral criminal laws of general applicability are per se valid even if
they burden the free exercise of religion. See id. at 876-79. Assessing the immediate after-
math of the decision, Doug Laycock wrote that "Smith produced widespread disbelief and
outrage.. . . An extraordinary coalition of religious and civil liberties groups has sought to
have Smith overturned, first by an unsuccessful petition for rehearing and now by proposed
legislation." Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 1
(1990). The legislation he mentioned, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, was indeed
passed, and spawned yet further litigation. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
Public Law 103-141 (1993); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the
part of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act applying to the states as exceeding Congress's
enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment).
8 I am not convinced that the category of "religious conservative" is a useful one, or that
its application can answer more questions than it raises, but it is a phrase that appears in
common parlance. One potential confusion-that between a conservative orientation toward
politics and toward a particular religious tradition-is already treated in Shiffrin's account; as
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Eisgruber and Larry Sager's book, Religious Freedom and the Constitu-
tion,9 as his primary foil. Their recourse to equality leads them to oppose
tight connections between church and state but also to favor free exercise
rights for religion only to the extent that religious minorities have been
discriminated against.10 Hence we are left with the quandary of whether
secularists can strongly favor religious free exercise and whether the re-
ligious can endorse the separation of church and state.
Later I will argue that the doctrinal position Shiffrin associates with
religious liberals can, indeed, be occupied by secular liberals as well, but
here I would like to suggest that even some religious conservatives may
take the same approach. The historical roots of the Establishment Clause
and some of the impetus behind its enforcement are connected with mi-
nority religionists' resistance against imposition of the dominant tradi-
tion.II Following this logic, religious practitioners who hold positions on
he elaborates, the designations "religious conservative" and "religious liberal" do not, in his
work, refer to theological positions. SHIFFRIN, supra note 1, at 1. Several other significant
confusions, however, remain. The category of "religious conservative" could embrace those
whose politics are conservative because of religion and those who simply happen to be both
politically conservative and religious. Relatedly, as Kent Greenawalt discusses in his contribu-
tion, Shiffrin's model places even religious liberals who do not invoke religious reasons in the
public sphere within the category of "secular liberals." See Kent Greenawalt, In Celebration
of Steven Shiffrin's The Religious Left and Church-State Relations, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 746-47 nn.32-35 and accompanying text (2010). There does not, however, appear to
be an equivalent category of "secular conservative" that would include conservatives who are
religious believers but do not rely on religion in promoting particular political positions. Due
to these and other difficulties, I will not attempt to identify anyone as a "religious conserva-
tive" per se.
That said, some scholars and jurists who are viewed as conservative do advocate for a
more expansive conception of the Free Exercise Clause than Justice Scalia endorses. One
example is Michael McConnell, who was generally regarded as a conservative at the time of
his resignation from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 2009. See
Tony Mauro, Judge McConnell to Step Down from l0th Circuit Bench, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER
4 (May 7, 2009) (explaining that "McConnell is usually categorized as a conservative .... But
he clerked for the liberal Justice William Brennan Jr., criticized Bush v. Gore and has tangled
more than once with Justice Scalia over First Amendment doctrine."). McConnell has argued
vigorously that accommodations for the free exercise of religion are both normatively desira-
ble and consistent with historical practice. See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revi-
sionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Cm. L. REv. 1109, 1111 (1990) (criticizing the Smith
decision on the basis of "the opinion's use of legal sources-text, history, and precedent-and
its theoretical argument," and arguing that "Smith is contrary to the deep logic of the First
Amendment"); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of the Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. Rv. 1409, 1511-12 (1990) (contending that "[t]he mod-
em argument against religious exemptions, based on the establishment clause, is ... histori-
cally unsupportable," and that,"[w)ithout overstating the force of the evidence, it is possible to
say that the modem doctrine of free exercise exemptions is more consistent with the original
understanding than is a position that leads only to the facial neutrality of legislation").
9 CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE
CONsTrTrrUTION (2007).
10 See id. at 13, 16-20.
11 See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment
Clause, 100 MIcH. L. REv. 279, 307 (2001) (describing how, from the 1930s onward, "Jewish
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other matters that would usually be associated with religious conserva-
tism might also oppose close connections between church and state, pre-
cisely because those connections would serve to devalue their own
particular religious heritage. To the extent that Shiffrin is defining a re-
ligious Left as co-extensive with a particular doctrinal orientation toward
the Religion Clauses, I am, for these reasons, not certain that Shiffrin's
classification is entirely airtight. Nevertheless, there remains substantial
value in demonstrating why religious liberals might endorse positions on
the Religion Clauses that are not consistent with those often associated in
the popular imagination with religious conservatives.
In addition to disassociating many religious believers from certain
positions on the Religion Clauses, Shiffrin writes strongly in favor of the
constitutionality of compulsory, non-religious, public education, at least
during the adolescent years. Citing the values of "democratic education,
autonomy, empathy, creativity and imagination, respect and tolerance,
social skills, equality, and justice," he contends that public education
could, in most circumstances, constitutionally be required by the state,
although the state should not insist on such a power because of the public
opinion on church-state relations was intensely separationist, and Jews would play a prominent
role both in resisting aid to religious schools and in excluding religion from public educa-
tion"). Justice Brennan further explained the role of religious minorities in increasing sensitiv-
ity to perceived government endorsements of religion:
[O]ur religious composition makes us a vastly more diverse people than were our
forefathers. They knew differences chiefly among Protestant sects. Today the Na-
tion is far more heterogeneous religiously, including as it does substantial minorities
not only of Catholics and Jews but as well of those who worship ... no God at all.
In the face of such profound changes, practices which may have been objectionable
to no one in the time of Jefferson and Madison may today be highly offensive to
many persons, the deeply devout and the nonbelievers alike.
School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 240-41(1963) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (internal citation omitted). Furthermore, as Justice Black noted with regard to the origi-
nal impetus behind the constitutional restriction on the establishment of religion:
Another purpose of the Establishment Clause rested upon an awareness of the histor-
ical fact that governmentally established religions and religious persecutions go hand
in hand. The Founders knew that only a few years after the Book of Common
Prayer became the only accepted form of religious services in the established Church
of England, an Act of Uniformity was passed to compel all Englishmen to attend
those services and to make it a criminal offense to conduct or attend religious gather-
ings of any other kind-a law which was consistently flouted by dissenting religious
groups in England and which contributed to widespread persecutions of people like
John Bunyan ....
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 432-33 (1962) (internal citations omitted). But see STEPHEN M.
FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE SEPA-
RATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1998) (arguing that the norm of separation of church and state
pre-dates the First Amendment and that it was connected with a history of anti-Semitism);
PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002) (elaborating on how the pas-
sage on the state level of the so-called "Blane Amendments" prohibiting government funding
of religious organizations derived from nineteenth-century anti-Catholic sentiment).
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backlash this stance would produce.12 Given that Shiffrin does not be-
lieve mandatory public education should be implemented, one might
wonder what purpose defending its constitutionality retains. The rhetori-
cal force of Shiffrin's position is, I would contend, quite strong. In re-
cent years, the United States has reached a crucial turning point in public
education, not only because of the rise of voucher programs, which Shif-
frin discusses, but also because of the vast increase in the amount of
religious homeschooling. As Kim Yuracko recently wrote in Education
Off the Grid,
Homeschooling was common in the United States before
the nineteenth century, but by the early 1980s the prac-
tice was illegal in most states. Since then, homeschool-
ing has enjoyed a dramatic rebirth. Today,
homeschooling is legal in all states. Estimates of the
number of children currently homeschooled range from
1.1 to 2 million. The 1.1 million estimate represents 2.2
percent of the school-age population in the country. 13
This trend toward homeschooling often carries with it, Yuracko argues,
detrimental gender-based effects as well as difficulties in enforcing edu-
cational standards.' 4
The trend also stands in contrast to the educational policy of a num-
ber of European countries, including Germany and Sweden, which have
long traditions of requiring school attendance. Indeed, just last year, a
German family wishing to homeschool their children emigrated to the
United States and claimed asylum on the ground that deprivation of the
right to homeschool constituted persecution on the basis of religion.15
An immigration judge recently ruled in their favor, determining that
homeschoolers constituted a particular "social group" whose members
had a "well-founded fear of persecution."16 Nor has the claim of a right
12 See SHnmIFp, supra note 1, at 68, 80-81.
13 Kim Yuracko, Education Off the Grid: Constitutional Constraints on Homeschooling,
96 CAL. L. REv. 123, 124-25 (2008).
14 See id. at 134, 156-57.
15 Rose French, German Family Seeks U.S. Asylum to Homeschool Kids, USA TODAY,
Mar. 31, 2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2009-03-3 1-home
school-christianN.htm.
16 Ben Conery, Home-schoolers Win Asylum in U.S.; Germans Fled 'Persecution',
WASH. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2010, at Al; Campbell Robertson, Judge Grants Asylum to German
Home Schoolers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2010) (adding that Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment has appealed the decision). In order to receive asylum in the United States, individuals
must demonstrate that they "are 'refugee[s],' who are people 'unable or unwilling' to return to
their home countries 'because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion
.... Weng v. Holder, 593 F.3d 66, 71 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(l)(B)(i),
1101(a)(42)(A) (2006)).
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to homeschool been restricted exclusively to the immigration context. A
2009 appellate decision in California dealt with whether a child could be
ordered to attend public or private school-in other words, any educa-
tional option other than homeschooling-as part of a dependency pro-
ceeding.' 7 Although the court ultimately upheld the underlying order, it
did so only after determining that the governmental action would pass
muster under a strict scrutiny analysis, and the court decided the case in
such a way as to avoid what it deemed the difficult constitutional ques-
tion of whether home schooling could be prohibited in general. 18 In the
face of these increasing claims, in various legal contexts, of a right to
religious homeschooling, the arguments that Shiffrin musters in favor of
mandatory public education provide an important countervailing force.
Finally, Shiffrin supplies cogent reasons why, contra Rawls, actors
in the political sphere may justifiably use religious as well as secular
arguments, contending that "[p]ublic reason disease can be fatal in
American politics."' 9 Citing the efficacy of Christian evangelists' ap-
peals to the American public and the inability of secular liberals to ad-
dress the central theological arguments animating certain conservative
political positions, Shiffrin contends that religious arguments may and
should be used persuasively in politics. 20 History supports this conclu-
sion. Anyone familiar with the pamphlet wars of seventeenth-century
England, in which readings of John of Patmos's Revelation were paired
with claims about the contemporary political scene and biblical accounts
of paternity were used to justify the political order,21 will both acknowl-
edge the possibility of conducting sophisticated political debate through
the vehicle of religious doctrine and testify to the intensity of commit-
ment to the resultant political positions. In some circumstances, a
counter-argument from religion may indeed be the most effective way of
responding to an argument from religion.
Nevertheless, the seventeenth-century example might give us pause.
While seventeenth-century England was doubtless the site of much vig-
orous and important political debate, it was also the locus of a civil war,
17 See Jonathan L. v. Superior Court, 165 Cal. App. 4th 1074 (2d Dist. 2008).
18 See id. at 1101--04.
19 SHIFFRIN, supra note 1, at 126.
20 See id. at 126-27.
21 See Bernadette Meyler, Theaters of Pardoning: Tragicomedy and the Gunpowder
Plot, in 25 STUD. IN LAW, POL., AND Soc'Y 37, 59-73 (Austin Sarat ed., 2002) (discussing the
political deployments of Revelation in the seventeenth century). See generally ROBERT
FILMER, PATRIARCHA: THE NATURALL POWER OF KNGES DEFENDED AGAINST THE UNNATU-
RAL LIBERTY OF TE PEOPLE, in PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 6-12 (Johann P. Som-
merville ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991) (1680) (elaborating the Biblical authority for a
patriarchal conception of the state).
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as well as a quieter subsequent revolution.22 Furthermore, while histori-
ans have long disputed the dominant cause of the English Civil War,
religion has usually been mentioned as a prime factor. 23 This brings me
to the point where I part ways with Shiffrin-in the suggestion that relig-
ious liberals can offer more persuasive justifications for certain positions
on church-state relations than can those on the left who hold a secular
position. Although in America today the main divide is often depicted as
that between religious adherents and committed secularists, 24 so it might
seem more likely that religious believers would listen to those who had
not demonstrated skepticism about their world-view, the seventeenth-
century example should remind us that relations among religious groups
have, traditionally, been no less fraught than those between believers and
non-believers.
According to Shiffrin:
[I]t is particularly important to argue that tight church-
state relations are bad for religion. But in many contexts
that argument requires assumptions about what the mis-
sion of religious people might be and what does and
does not fit within the mission. This requires a theologi-
cal discussion. Religious liberals welcome that discus-
sion; even if some secular liberals think such discussion
is appropriate, they are generally less equipped to en-
gage in it.25
There is a plausibility to this claim; many religious individuals within the
United States may consider secular interests to be so different from their
own as not to be persuaded by secular justifications for maintaining a
strong Establishment Clause. Nevertheless, we have no reason to be-
lieve, I would suggest, that some religious groups would be any more
persuaded of the value of separation of church and state by arguments
from the standpoint of religion than by secular claims. Shiffrin cites
Roger Williams' warning about the dangers of merging religion and the
22 See generally CONRAD RUSSELL, THE CAUSES OF THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR (1990)
(detailing the genesis and episodes of the mid-seventeenth-century conflicts).
23 See, e.g., id. at 58-82 (considering the extent to which controversy over religion con-
tributed to the occurrence of the English Civil War).
24 See, e.g., NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM
7-8 (2005) (contrasting "values evangelicals" with "legal secularists," and explaining that,
while both groups share "[tihe goal of reconciling national unity with religious diversity ....
the methods for doing it are deeply opposed"); Michael McConnell, Justice Brennan's Accom-
modating Approach Toward Religion, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2187 (2007) ("In the absurd
polarization of American political culture, many have come to treat religion as a partisan mat-
ter."); Steven D. Smith, How is America 'Divided by God'?, 27 Miss. C. L. REv. 141, 157
(2007) (suggesting a divide between "the cultures of secularism and of strong religion," al-
though not identifying secularism exclusively with a lack of religious belief).
25 SHIFFRiN, supra note 1, at 99.
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state.26 Although Roger Williams issued this warning in the seventeenth
century, many subsequent religious groups have disregarded it and have
not been concerned about the extent to which involvement in politics
could corrupt religion itself. Despite the availability of religious argu-
ments against a close connection between church and state, there may
always remain religious individuals or groups that strive for closer ties
between faith and politics. More effective, however, may be religious
liberals' engagement with religious conservatives on other issues of pub-
lic policy, such as healthcare, the death penalty, birth control, or mar-
riage. Within these contexts, the presence of a religious Left position can
demonstrate that the opposition between the secular and the religious has
been drawn too starkly in America.
In addition to contending that those on the religious Left may be
able to provide justifications for a particular position on church-state re-
lations that are more persuasive to religious conservatives than those sup-
plied by secular liberals, Shiffrin maintains that religious liberals are able
to furnish a more persuasive account of the Religion Clauses as a whole.
Part of Shiffrin's argument rests on the premises that "the Constitution
favors religion" and that "[t]he Constitution protects religion because it is
valuable. '27 A discussion of these premises is beyond the scope of this
comment, but even if they are valid, I would contend that at least one
stance on constitutional interpretation would allow secular liberals to
take those premises into account just as strongly as religious liberals. It
would be rare, I think, to find an individual who had thought through
every clause of the Constitution and determined that each reflected pre-
cisely his world-view; if the Constitution does not exactly embody the
vantage point of each and every American, yet we believe it expresses
values that structure the nation and allow it to cohere, why should a secu-
lar liberal not be able to accept that the Constitution might value religion,
even if he or she does not?
Furthermore, I believe that secular liberals can offer justifications
for strong support of free exercise and rigorous adherence to restrictions
on the establishment of religion. Shiffrin seems to acknowledge that sec-
ular liberals have, in fact, put forth a number of grounds for resisting the
Supreme Court's decision in Smith and instead supporting exemptions
for religious practice from neutral laws of general applicability. 28 The
Establishment Clause, Shiffrin suggests, presents more difficult terrain
for secular liberals. As he states, "In the absence of legitimate stability
concerns, secular liberalism has a hard time explaining why religion
26 Id. at 32-33 (Williams "argued that God was not so stupid as to place the fate of
religion in the hands of politicians") (internal citation omitted).
27 Id. at 107.
28 See id. at 104-05.
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alone is subject to an Establishment Clause."'29 The prefatory clause of
this sentence, however, assumes away a lot. Many secular liberals may
believe-on the basis of substantial historical evidence-that religion
has furnished and continues to furnish the greatest possible threat to the
stability of the state. Avoiding as much government entanglement with
religion as possible may help to minimize that threat. In addition, secular
liberals may hold a more robust notion of what constitutes discrimination
against particular religious groups than Shiffrin suggests. As he
observes,
If religion is to be treated equally .... one might regard
aid to religious churches and schools that is used to pro-
mote religious messages as unproblematic (so long as it
is part of a program that does not discriminate against
nonreligious organizations). Yet most secular liberals
balk against any such aid. They want religion to be
treated equally in some respects, but not others.
30
One argument against such aid, as against voucher programs, follows
from a particular substantive vision of equality; if aid to religious schools
helps to promote already established and mainstream religions-as it
may well do-it could contribute to disfavoring minority religions.
3 1
Hence, through pursuing the equality rationale further, the secular liberal
may be able to justify objections against voucher programs as currently
constituted, even if not on an absolute basis.
Although I disagree that there exists a fundamental connection be-
tween the "religious Left" and a particular position on church-state rela-
tions, i.e., "favor[ing] free exercise and oppos[ing] tight connections
between church and state," and that religious liberals will always be able
to be more persuasive than secular liberals in arguing against positions
espoused by religious conservatives, I am delighted that The Religious
Left and Church-State Relations has brought the large group of people on
the religious Left in America to public attention. If Steve's own writings
29 Id. at 106.
30 Id.
31 Some evidence suggests that Catholic schools are over-represented among voucher
recipients, as might be anticipated from their long-standing existence. See V. Dion Haynes,
Vouchers Breathe New Life Into D.C. Catholic Schools: Tuition Rates, Morals Appeal to Par-
ents, WASH. POST, June 13, 2005, at Al. ("Of the 983 students in the voucher program, which
provides federal grants to District children to use toward tuition and fees at private or religious
schools, 61 percent are attending Catholic schools-a percentage that is expected to remain
roughly the same when the program expands to about 1,600 students this fall."); see also
Joseph M. O'Keefe, S.J., Catholic Schools and Vouchers: How the Empirical Reality Should
Ground the Debate, in SCHOOL CHOICE: THE MORAL DEBATE 195, 195 (Alan Wolfe ed., 2003)
(explaining that the proponents of vouchers include "pro-market think tanks and political ac-
tion organizations associated with the Republican Party, inner-city parents, and the Roman
Catholic Church").
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from a religious Left vantage point provide even a partial model, I have
no doubt that many important contributions of the religious Left will
follow.
